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In this [inflationary] situation a powerful alliance is likely to be 
formed between big business and rentier interests, and they would 
probably find more than one economist to declare that the 
situation was manifestly unsound. The pressure of all these 
forces, and in particular of big business – as a rule influential in 
government departments – would induce the government to 
return to the orthodox policy of cutting down the budget deficit. 
(Kalecki, 1943 [1990: 355]) 
Thirty years ago, in April 1975, Milton Friedman, came to Australia to 
declare that the world economic situation manifestly unsound.1 Friedman 
asserted on that trip what Michael Kalecki predicted in his 1943 article 
would be the response of ‘captains of industry’ to Keynesian 
macroeconomic policies; it was that ‘…government expenditure financed 
by borrowing will cause inflation’ (Kalecki, 1990: 348). A chorus of 
Australian businessmen and mandarin economists came out in support of 
Friedman, leading to the demise of Keynesian macroeconomic policy 
and the rise of neo-liberal policies. The contractionary process that 
                                                          
1 Milton Friedman, at the time was the Paul Snowden Russell Distinguished Service 
Professor of Economics at the University of Chicago; and acknowledged head of 
the ‘Chicago School’ of monetary economics, called ‘monetarism’. A year later, in 
1976, Friedman received the ‘Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in 
Memory of Alfred Nobel’, confirming his status in the financial community and 
the neo-liberal mainstream of the economics profession during this period. At the 
time he was also a regular contributor to Newsweek magazine. 
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emerged was more than a short-term ‘stop-go’ fine-tuning exercise that 
Kalecki identified as a political business cycle (PBC). It was the start of a 
political trend, enabling the capitalist class to assert its economic and 
social dominance over labour and to cleanse the capitalist economies of 
inefficient businesses and oversupplied old capital stock. 
This paper is a case study in the international transmission of ideas, 
namely how monetarism spread to Australia. It aims to identify an 
important watershed in Australian macroeconomic policy-making and 
the role that Milton Friedman, as the world’s leading monetarist, played 
in this paradigm shift from Keynesian to neo-liberal (anti-Keynesian) 
economic policies. In the process, the paper uses Kalecki’s PBC concept 
as a reference framework to understand how this paradigm shift came 
about and why the Friedman visit to Australia, financed by private 
businessmen, was pivotal in accelerating a paradigm shift. Conclusions 
from this case study of political business cycles indicate how an 
opposition political party in the Australian context can gain coherence 
and credibility for an alternative economic policy that initially was 
regarded as far-fetched. While Friedman’s denunciation of the simple-
minded Philips curve and other Keynesian precepts was known amongst 
Australian policy makers, the public reception (and in some cases, 
acclaim) of his visit paved the path for the official adoption of his 
policies. It was also a precursor of what was to later happen in Britain 
when monetarism entered public debate there, as Margaret Thatcher 
sought a new approach to economic management, including privatisation 
and major labour market ‘reforms’ (Jones, 1983).  
Australian Economic Policy Prior to Friedman’s Arrival 
Inflation accelerated to a peak in 1974-75 of 16.7 % (measured by the 
consumer price index, CPI) or 20.8 % (as measured by implicit price 
deflator for domestic final demand, IDFDD).2 This was extraordinary, 
                                                          
2 The CPI captures price changes in a basket on commonly bought consumer items, 
excluding capital goods. The IDFDD captures price changes from all components 
of final demand, including expenditures on capital goods and imported goods and 
services. 
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given that for most of the 1960s inflation was around four per cent by 
either measure (Junor, 1995: 40 & 49). As at August 1975 there was also 
4.6 % official unemployment, compared to 1.6 % for the decade 1962-72 
(Stegman, 1995: 64-5). The combination of the two resulted in 
stagflation (stagnation with inflation) that was unprecedented in 
Australian economic history but was reflective of similar dire economic 
conditions in other advanced capitalist economies around the globe. This 
climate of economic uncertainty was exacerbated by political uncertainty 
created by a reformist Whitlam Labor Government which, after many 
years in the opposition wilderness, wanted to take advantage of the 
strong and stable economic growth through the 1960s to benefit a 
broader sector of the Australian society. Into this world of uncertainty 
stepped Friedman, with assured presence and a simple recipe for 
returning to stable conditions. 
The Whitlam Government was elected in December 1972 against a 
backdrop of a fully employed economy and even a one-off year (1972-
73) of balance of payments surplus. The economic bounty suggested that 
it would be practical to implement Whitlam’s election promises. The 
only apparent bugbear was that their predecessors, now in Opposition, 
had allowed an inflationary problem to linger. Annual IDFDD inflation 
rates of 6.5% (1970-71) and 7.3% (1971-72) were significant for the 
time, coming from both domestic cost pressures and rising import prices 
(Junor, 1995: 47). The prior McMahon Liberal-Country Party 
Government, by first refusing to deal with average wage increases of 
over 10% for 1972 and then by not revaluing the Australian currency to 
adequately reflect market conditions3, exposed the economy to 
underlying economic tensions. The Labor leader, E.G. (Gough) Whitlam, 
had little understanding or aptitude for economics and was committed to 
significant social reform through government spending despite these 
economic clouds on the horizon. 
With the economy in boom through 1973, the Federal Treasury was 
aghast at the growth in outlays, and thus it advised caution. In his first 
                                                          
3 ‘The logical response was to revalue the dollar against the greenback [US dollar] 
by at least 7.9%. Instead, under pressure from Nationals [Country Party coalition 
partner], PM Billy McMahon came up with a revaluation of 6.3% - a formula for 
inflationary pressure’ (Walsh, 2005). 
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budget as Federal Treasurer, Frank Crean allowed the inflationary 
problem to loom larger by allowing a significant growth in federal 
outlays financed by Treasury notes and cash balances with the central 
bank (Whitwell, 1986: 208). Fred Gruen, Whitlam’s economic adviser, 
later recalled that the demand pressures building in 1973-74 were of ‘a 
greater intensity’ than anything since the end of World War II (cited in 
Whitwell, 1986: 208). A 25% tariff cut (July) and a further 4.8% 
revaluation (September)4 by the new Labor Government in its first year 
(1973) helped macroeconomic policy by diverting demand pressures to 
imports. There was also price control aimed at big business in the form 
of the Prices Justification Tribunal (PJT), which Chapman and Junor 
(1981) argue assisted in reducing the inflation rate from what it otherwise 
would have been without the PJT. However on the fiscal policy front, 
Crean – who had been Shadow Treasurer for twenty years - was not 
tough enough to exercise restraint on the growth in departmental 
expenditures that the Treasury felt advisable. 
Australia’s domestically generated inflation and unemployment problems 
were then exacerbated by the quadrupling of oil prices by the 
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) cartel in the year 
from December 1973. Continuing strong wages expansion in the first two 
years of the Labor Government further facilitated a booming economy 
(Whitwell, 1986: 210-211). As a result, the wages share of national 
income rose at the expense of profits.5 An industry submission to the 
Cabinet from the Trade Development Council regarding the 1974-75 
Budget suggested that the Government seemed ‘unable or unwilling’ to 
confront the inflation problem. The Council encouraged the Government 
to recognise that Australia’s inflation was being led by wage-push 
factors, not by demand. It warned that higher unemployment was 
imminent though it would have some ‘therapeutic’ benefit.6  
                                                          
4 This is additional to a revaluation of the exchange rate of 7% by the Whitlam 
Government immediately it came to power in December 1972 (Jones and Perkins, 
1981: 364). 
5 This only partly redressed the 10% shift of the national product from labour to 
capital which occurred during the early 1950s under the Menzies Liberal-Country 
Party Government (Catley and McFarlane, 1981: p.78). 
6 See ‘Economic Conditions’, Trade Development Council, A5925, 2431/EC, 
National Archives of Australia. 
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With fiscal policy already prescribed, the Labor Government moved to 
contain the inflation problem by sharply raising interest rates in late 
1973. According to Whitwell (1986: 213-214), the subsequent credit 
squeeze went on for far too long and thus led to the subsequent recession. 
Firms and businesses were caught short, having built up their stocks and 
over-ordered to catch up with a booming domestic demand. Given the 
sudden appearance of weak markets, Australian firms could not easily 
pass on wage and other cost increases. Profit margins were further 
squeezed. Moreover, the public sector was increasing its command over 
resources at the expense of the private sector. This was the classic 
scenario predicted by Kalecki (1943) in his PBC perspective of the ‘stop-
go’ Keynesian policy approach: i.e. strong cost-push inflation on top of 
demand pressures, together with increasing resources at the disposal of 
the public sector. This scenario was ripe for the Opposition leadership to 
exploit. 
Into this macroeconomic cauldron came Dr. Jim Cairns, who was 
ideological leader of the Labor left and hero of the anti-Vietnam 
Moratorium Movement. During the May 1974 successful election 
campaign, Cairns: 
…became Labor’s most effective counter to the Liberal-Country 
Party thrust on inflation. He understood inflation as well as 
anyone on either side of politics and had a better capacity than 
most for reducing it to simple ideas suitable for political rallies, 
television and radio. (Ormonde, 1981: 170) 
Cairns perceived inflation as the outgrowth of the pricing practices of 
multinationals (in Australia and from overseas), the military arms race 
and excessive wages growth.7 In this context, Cairns provided the left 
with an ideal standard-bearer in a period of economic crisis. Whitlam 
believed that too, so that, after his colleagues elected Cairns Deputy 
Prime Minister in June 1974, Whitlam suggested to Cairns that he should 
take over as Treasurer. Cairns initially rejected the suggestion, but 
eventually he was appointed in November of the same year (Ormonde, 
1981: 181-86).  
                                                          
7 ‘Inside Dr Cairns’, The Australian Financial Review 4 September 1974. 
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In a speech in October 1974 to the Labor faithful, ‘Cairns told his 
audience he believed that the events of the years leading to 1975 could 
prove as significant for economic theory as those leading up to 1930. The 
only way to deal with inflation was through social reform’ (Ormonde, 
1981: 182). The problem of inflation he ominously attributed to ‘the 
system’. His words were prophetic in hindsight but, as this paper argues, 
more in terms of Kalecki’s view of how capitalists reassert their power, 
rather than Cairns’s view of collective action of the masses supporting 
Labor. 
Cairns’s influence on economic policy preceded his own appointment to 
the Treasury. The 1974-75 Budget (handed down in September 1974 by 
Crean) became known as ‘Cairns’s Budget’. This budget was unorthodox 
in a period of very high inflation, providing urban renewal to deprived 
areas, low-income tax relief and a 33% increase in government 
expenditure, together with increased taxes for the business sector. The 
idea was to encourage union agreement for wage restraint, thus limiting 
the pass-on of international inflation through cost pressures in Australia. 
However, the budget was unacceptable to the business community. John 
Valder, Chairman of the Sydney Stock Exchange, ‘…saw the Budget as 
disguised socialism’ (Ormonde, 1981: 180).  
The ‘captains of industry’ needed a strong powerful voice to counter 
Cairns’s growing popularity, influence and power,8 and to justify the 
suspension of fixed investment spending (a capital strike) that became 
apparent.9 Meanwhile, Friedman, through his monetary theory research, 
his simple messages in regular Newsweek columns and his persuasive 
personality, had developed a strong international academic profile as the 
leading monetarist. Friedman’s strong pronouncements against 
government expenditure and support for an increased role for ‘the 
market’ provided Australia’s powerful business interests with a perfect 
antidote to Cairns’s ‘socialism’. By the end of 1974, arrangements were 
under way for Friedman to visit Australia and express his views that 
                                                          
8 Ormonde (1981: 180-1) noted that in ‘…the wilderness of the western suburbs of 
Melbourne and Sydney the reaction to the Budget was optimistic.’ 
9 This is despite a mini-budget tax cut for individuals and companies on the 12 
November. See ‘Capital goes on strike and freezes spending’ The National Times 
24 March 1975. 
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counter-cyclical Keynesian economics (represented in Australia by 
Cairns) was ‘manifestly unsound’. 
In the context of the opening quote by Kalecki, the influential public 
institution that led the business orthodox position was, as Evan Jones 
articulates, Australia’s central bank, the Reserve Bank of Australia 
(RBA) (Jones, 1983: 436). A week into his new portfolio as Treasurer, 
Cairns received a missive from the RBA Governor, Sir John Phillips, 
with his ‘solution’ to stagflation. The malaise in the business sector, 
Phillips felt, was deep-seated in character and could not be resolved by 
the re-emergence of a boom in spending led by government. Phillips felt 
it advisable that government expenditures and the rate of monetary 
expansion be reined back as inflation was badly disrupting business 
planning. The Governor articulated the new wisdom that when inflation 
is high and expected to continue, the choice between inflation and 
unemployment disappears; any action to create more jobs merely adds to 
inflationary expectations and, in turn, a further rise in unemployment. 
Apart from keeping wage pressures under check, reducing the rate of 
government spending would restore confidence to the private sector.10 
Judging by his subsequent actions, Cairns was unimpressed with 
Phillips’s advice. 
Phillips’s advice stemmed from the RBA’s 1973 Annual Report that was 
noticeable for joining with the dominant economics government 
department, the Treasury, in arguing that inflation mattered more than 
unemployment. The dominant culture amongst the RBA’s economists 
had recently become monetarist. It was symbolised the year before 
(1973) by the presence of a leading English monetarist, Michael Parkin 
within the Research Department.11 Economists and senior officials 
within the RBA were the first to accept ‘inflationary expectations’ as a 
significant factor within the policy domain (McGuinness, 1975). 
Treasury economists, too, accepted the importance of inflationary 
expectations before comparable acknowledgement by their academic 
brethren (Stone, 2004: 267). Despite its misgivings about some of 
                                                          
10 Sir J. Phillips to J.F. Cairns, 18/12/1974, A 5931 CL 155, National Archives of 
Australia. 
11 ‘Reserve Bank backs the Treasury line’ The Australian Financial Review 28 
August 1974. 
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Friedman’s work, the Treasury became more monetarist in outlook 
following the salutary experience of late 1973 credit squeeze.  
Apart from the neo-liberal tendencies of leading economists at Monash 
University (for example, Richard Snape and Michael Porter), the vast 
majority of Australian academic economists in 1974 did not accept the 
full gamut of the monetarist orthodoxy (Hughes, 1980: 44). They were 
‘mostly confirmed Keynesians’ in their belief in the efficacy of fiscal 
policy (Nevile and Stammer, 1972: 9). At the instigation of Bob Hawke, 
then Federal President of the ALP and President of the ACTU, Victor 
Argy of the ANU (urged on by Trevor Swan) penned a letter which was 
counter- signed by 130 economists, supporting the Labor Government’s 
economic policies, which it took to the 1974 May federal election 
(Guttman, 2005: 33; Butlin and Gregory 1989: 375-6). Hughes (1980: 
44) argues that most Australian academic economists did not accept the 
charge by Friedman that Keynesianism was invalid. Jones (1983: 435) 
detected that, even in the early 1980s, most Australian economists 
remained, for several reasons, sympathetic to Keynesianism. Two groups 
of economists, one at the Melbourne Institute and the other at Adelaide, 
suggested policies inspired by institutional economist John Kenneth 
Galbraith (Friedman’s major public opponent in the USA) that were 
broader than the standard ‘stop-go’ Keynesian approach, including wage 
indexation and taxes on speculation as more effective ways to curb 
inflation. Cairns articulated similar policy solutions at the time in order 
to, as he said himself, ‘…keep people in jobs and I’m not mesmerised by 
any economic theory’ (cited in Ormonde, 1981: 215). 
The Opposition’s Shadow Treasurer, Philip Lynch, receptive to local 
monetarist voices, including some within his staff, had begun to 
reconstruct a new economic program distinct from the discredited policy 
platform taken into the 1974 election by the Coalition (Guttman, 2005: 
43-46). Lynch entertained a hunch that Friedman’s prophecies and 
mantras were something upon which to build a new credible alternative 
economic policy and also to develop a robust monetarist critique of 
Labor’s economic policy. Cairns rebutted Lynch’s parliamentary 
question on 9 April 1975, a question which implied that the ballooning 
government deficit was causing the rising inflation rate. Cairns said: 
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The deficit was aimed directly at the economy to increase 
production, to get the economy going and to employ resources 
wherever there are resources available for employment. The 
Labor Government will never see those resources remain 
unemployed because of a shortage of money. That battle was 
fought in this country 50 years ago and we are not going to fight 
it again.12  
Barely more than a stone throw away in Canberra, Friedman had just 
finished an address to the National Press Club on how to control inflation 
by narrowing the role of government in the economy.13 
The Friedman Visit 
Friedman arrived from Chile to begin his Australian lecture tour on 1 
April 1975. A Sydney stockbroking firm, Constable and Bain, under the 
leadership of Maurice Newman, arranged and financed his trip 
(Friedman and Friedman, 1998: 427-428).14 Newman, currently the 
Chairman of the Australian Stock Exchange, was described as a close 
friend who was also ‘a convinced libertarian, a member of the Mont 
Pelerin Society’15 (Friedman and Friedman, 1998: 428). A veneer of 
academic gravitas came from a body called the Graduate Business 
School Club. QANTAS was also generous in its financing of the 
Melbourne fares for Friedman (CEDA, 1975: ii). A booklet published to 
mark the occasion declared that the purpose of the visit ‘…was intended 
                                                          
12 ‘Deficit budget best means to aid the economy’, The Canberra Times 10 April 
1975. 
13 ‘Exchange control seen as violation of freedoms’, The Canberra Times 10 April 
1975. 
14 Newman, now Chancellor of Macquarie University, recalls that the apart from 
having his trip and accommodation paid for, Friedman received a modest fee of 
$5,000 for giving several public lectures. Since the trip was therefore financed by 
private funds, Friedman could not accept an offer from Peter Groenewegen to give 
the 1975 R.C. Mills lecture at the University of Sydney (Personal communication 
with one of the authors). 
15 The Mont Pelerin Society, founded in 1947 by Frederich von Hayek and other 
European intellectuals, was a think-tank which espoused libertarian economics 
(Cockett,1995,100-121).  
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to heighten public awareness of the dangers of inflation and to point to 
possible cures consistent with the maintenance of individual liberty and 
free enterprise’ (Friedman, 1975: 5). Apart from upholding all this, 
Newman was keen to inject more debate into the causes of inflation as he 
felt that the local discussion had become staid and wanting.16   
 Friedman had risen to pre-eminence with a simple restatement of the 
Quantity Theory of Money (QTM) in 1956, at a time when economists 
had accepted the received Keynesian wisdom that the QTM was obsolete 
(Friedman, 1956a).17  Like the monk Martin Luther, Friedman shocked 
the American economics establishment by putting forward, in a 1970 
address entitled ‘The Counter Revolution in Monetary Theory’, his 
eleven theses on the relationship between monetary supply and output 
(Bernanke, 2003: 1-2). In short, Friedman held that controlling monetary 
aggregates was the key to dealing with the business cycle. The use of 
government spending to stimulate the economy and to provide jobs was 
counter-productive because such spending required additional and 
uncontrollable monetary growth. Friedman said the choice was not 
between inflation and unemployment but between some unemployment 
now or more unemployment later. As soon as workers realised that 
inflation was rising, caused by excessive government spending, wages 
would increase and, with it, unemployment; while the subsequent anti-
inflationary medicine meant a higher amount of unemployment in the 
future. Inflation, he insisted, was not due to militant trade unionism or 
avaricious businessmen but rather was solely due to excessive monetary 
growth. Friedman’s mission was to discredit Keynesian policies and the 
discretionary ‘stop-go’ macro-management of the economy. In its place 
came the panacea of allowing a measured increase in the money supply 
to guarantee economic stability through the market mechanism, while no 
budget deficits were permitted to fuel monetary growth.18 
A leading economic journalist, Paddy McGuinness, unaware perhaps of 
Kalecki’s remark (quoted at the start of this article) about hiring an 
                                                          
16 Personal communication with one of the authors. 
17 The four subsequent essays in Friedman (1956b) are empirical studies by students 
of Friedman that purport to verify the Friedman restatement. 
18 For a simply explained pro-monetarism book published at the peak of its short 
ascendance, see McCulloch (1982). 
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economist to disparage expansionary economic policy, suggested that the 
visit might induce other stockbroking firms and financiers to follow suit 
(McGuinness, 1975).19  McGuinness (who had studied aspects of 
monetarism at the London School of Economics during the 1950s) did 
not think that the visit would result in the ‘sudden conversion’ to 
monetarism simply because the process was well under way. Although 
this was true for some of the staffers in the backrooms of the Liberal 
Party who had entertained a monetarist agenda since the loss of the 1974 
election, McGuinness overplayed just how far the conversion had gone. 
There were still strong believers in the conventional wisdom of 
Keynesianism both within the community and at the commanding 
heights of policy-making. The Friedman position, with its questionable 
theoretical and empirical elements, was also contentious within the 
mainstream economics profession.20 A leading pro-monetarist book 
began its second edition with the statement: ‘In 1975 when the first 
edition of this book appeared, monetarism was regarded as something of 
an eccentricity by most economists’ (McCulloch, 1982: vii). This 
statement clearly shows that Lynch was courageous in persuading his 
party from 1974 onwards to adopt a monetarist approach (let alone trying 
to convince the ‘rural socialists’ in its coalition partner, the Country 
Party). 
The impact of the Friedman mission to Australia (after his success in 
Chile21) was powerful and immediate. In part this was due to Friedman’s 
own charismatic and persuasive appeal, as well as a generally compliant 
and uncritical media that was willing to give much space to his ideas. A 
pro-business thinktank, the Institute of Public Affairs, while not in 
agreement with Friedman’s views on the expansion of the public sector, 
likened the visit to ‘a breath of fresh air’ (IPA, 1975: 29). Friedman’s 
simple message about the causes of inflation appeared to clear away 
                                                          
19 Paddy McGuinness, a one-time economic adviser to Labor member, Bill Hayden, 
took up the monetarist cause with impressionable fervour (Guttman, 2003: 69-70). 
20 For strongly critical responses to monetarism published around the time of its 
ascendance, see Kaldor (1982) and Nell and Azarchs (1984). 
21 Frank (1979) describes how monetarism came to Chile and dominated 
macroeconomic policy in the late 1970s. Friedman’s visit in 1975 was the initial 
foray after the USA-inspired overthrow of the democratically elected Salvador 
Allende government in Chile in September 1973. 
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some of the clouds of confusion about how to deal with stagflation. In 
general, the visit would shape the climate of economic opinion that the 
money supply mattered and that government should ‘intervene’ much 
less in the economy. This was the thin edge of the neo-liberal wedge, and 
it was Friedman who drove in the wedge by convincing governments of 
(as Kalecki puts it) the need for fiscal orthodoxy. Friedman’s arrival 
would have as much impact upon the Australian political scene as his 
later forays to Britain during the early 1980s (Parsons, 1989).  
Meanwhile, Cairns, the leading political advocate for anti-monetarism in 
Australia, was being isolated and diverted. Brian Brogan, his main 
economic adviser, ‘…was at this stage giving much of his time to 
hearings of the Jackson committee on manufacturing industry, of which 
he was a member’ (Ormonde, 1981: 214). Brogan also felt he was no 
longer as effective, because Cairns’s new Private Secretary, Junie 
Morosi, became the catalyst for Cairns’s major personal transformation 
away from economics and into moral philosophy.22 At the executive 
policy level Cairns became isolated, with Morosi guarding access to him 
especially from Treasury officials (Strangio, 2002: 321-22). 
‘Consequently,…He had no regular personal confidante’ (Ormonde, 
1981: 214). 
Friedman’s eighteen-day visit was well publicised and provoked much 
comment in the media. Apart from addresses to business forums, banks 
and universities, Friedman also gave public addresses in Sydney, 
Canberra and Melbourne. His arranged meeting with Whitlam was 
cancelled because the Prime Minister had quickly ascertained who 
Friedman blamed for causing the inflation rate to soar (Friedman and 
Friedman, 1998: 430). Friedman did, however, observe Whitlam in a 
parliamentary question time session saying that he would rather listen to 
Bob Hawke than Milton Friedman about identifying the factor behind 
inflation (Friedman and Friedman, 1998: 431). Friedman did meet the 
ALP caucus Economics and Trade Committee and the Opposition front 
bench. He also gave seminars at the RBA and the Treasury. His views 
struck a chord in financial circles (representing ‘rentier interests’) and the 
                                                          
22 Morosi had no interest in economics and was heard to say ‘What do we have on 
this Milton Friedman?’ (Strangio, 2002: 321). 
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then relatively few bank economists, as there was an intellectual 
uncertainty over the correct economic policy that Australian authorities 
should adopt to deal with stagflation. The apparent failure of ‘stop-go’ 
Keynesianism to respond to stagflation fanned the growing uncertainty as 
to whether one could continue to have a nicely managed economy. 
Friedman reflected a libertarian belief that it was time for governments to 
assume less omnipotence in the art of economic management and to 
adopt a political agenda of smaller government with less interventionism. 
Friedman was the salesman for offering something less grand. Nicholas 
Kaldor, (1982: 78) a leading Cambridge Keynesian economist, described 
monetarism as a new doctrine ‘…assiduously propagated…by a growing 
band of enthusiasts, combining the fervour of early Christians and selling 
power of a Madison Avenue executive’. Friedman was both messiah and 
showman. The Economist (1970) had once described Friedman as ‘able 
to argue the hind leg off a horse’. He was also, as Australia was to see, an 
adept television performer. Friedman appeared on the ABC-TV program 
Monday Conference which, given its popular impact, was repeated six 
weeks later. In the audience were economists like Colin Clark, Heinz 
Arndt and Duncan Ironmonger who came away convinced that much of 
Friedman’s analysis and policy was probably correct. Both Clark and 
Arndt took the opportunity to criticise Cairns’s handling of the economy 
as ‘irresponsible’, with Arndt forecasting that inflation would climb to 
over 30% if government spending continued at its current rate.23 
Ironmonger, from the University of Melbourne, prefaced a question to 
Friedman with the gushing remark ‘A lot of what you are saying is 
agreeing with a lot of what we’re saying. A lot of sense is being said 
which is comfort to us’ (cited in Hughes, 1980: 43). 
At Friedman’s opening seminar, organised by Newman and held in 
Sydney before a capacity audience of 500 people mostly drawn from the 
business sector, a presiding panel of four economists was seen nodding 
in agreement at his discourse and the way he fielded answers.24 
Considerable support for the Friedman line began to build during the 
visit and continued to strengthen after the visit, with credible academic 
                                                          
23 ‘Moderate cut sought in currency rate’, The Canberra Times 22 April 1975. 
24 ‘Friedman deflates indexationists’, The Bulletin 12 April 1975.  
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defence of the position and a compliant media enthralled by the new 
wisdom. Friedman’s public speeches were replete with continual 
reproduction of the same message in neat phrases, adorned with pseudo-
scientific but simple graphs linking the growth in money supply with the 
subsequent inflation rate.25  
During the same month the leading Cambridge left-wing Keynesian 
economist Joan Robinson entertained Australian audiences.26 She was 
also given some airplay to announce her views on inflation and other 
economic matters. In her own Monday Conference program, also 
televised in April, and subsequently in her R.C. Mills lecture at the 
University of Sydney, she accused Friedman of engaging in a sleight of 
hand by deliberately confusing the money supply with money 
expenditure as a cloak to recommend deflationary economic policy.27 
Robinson, like Cairns, saw cost-push inflation as the outcome of a 
sociological struggle between capital and labour over the national 
income. In order for inflation to be expressed, she conceded, the money 
supply must increase, but only as a consequence of demands of trade 
coming out of this struggle and the consequent profit and wage increases. 
This tended to give legitimacy to Friedman’s argument in the eyes of the 
‘captains of industry’ and their supportive acolytes. When Maurice 
Newman (organiser of the Friedman visit) asked Robinson about the 
primacy of the money supply and received what, to his mind, was an 
unsatisfactory response, he remarked in a high-handed manner: ‘I think 
we’d be here all night debating backwards and forwards and I’m sure 
that we wouldn’t achieve much purpose because I couldn’t convince 
Professor Robinson, and I’m sure she couldn’t convince me’.28 In a 
spirited, witty performance Robinson turned the ‘fight inflation first’ 
                                                          
25 John Nevile, at the time Professor of Economics at the University of NSW (now 
Emeritus Professor), was Chairperson of the Sydney public address. When one of 
the authors asked Nevile in late 2004 to recall that address (published in Friedman 
1975), his one memory was the annoyance that he felt when Friedman presented 
simple graphs that were not the ones that Friedman had published in recognised 
academic journals. The latter were more complex and with significant 
qualifications and limitations stated in the published form. 
26 ‘Professor Joan Robinson, the first left-wing Keynesian economist in Australia 
too’, National Times 28 April, 1975. 
27 Monday Conference ABC transcript, 28 April 1975, 4. 
28 Monday Conference ABC transcript, 28 April 1975, 5. 
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credo on its head by saying that the credo itself was by definition 
inflationary as it reduced aggregate output, creating supply constraints.  
Robinson also stated that monetarism took on some rather unsavoury 
political attributes by using unemployment as a means to suppress wage 
demands, a view often expressed by Cairns himself. However, Robinson 
did not help Cairns’s case by assailing what she called ‘Bastard 
Keynesianism’ (see Robinson, 1975). In her R. C. Mills lecture at the 
University of Sydney, when she stated that she did not subscribe to 
indiscriminate use of deficits in a ‘stop-go’ manner, libertarians saw this 
as a swipe against Cairns’s budget policy. They ignored Robinson’s 
strong statement of her abhorrence of any macroeconomic policy that 
increased unemployment.  
Aftermath of Friedman’s Visit 
In the televised Monday Conference exposure of the two economic titans 
(Friedman and Robinson), events would suggest that Friedman won the 
battle in terms of public exposure and simplicity of argument. In terms of 
political impact, the Friedman visit exceeded all of Newman’s 
expectations. Some of those who attended Friedman’s lectures came 
away with a distinctly monetarist outlook (Guttman, 2005: 58). 
Friedman’s pronouncements gave much needed credibility to the 
Liberal’s economic policy platform erected by Lynch. Brian Buckley, 
press agent to Lynch, recalled that (even then) Friedman had ‘celebrity’ 
status that allowed followers to say to detractors ‘Well, as Milton 
Friedman says, contradict that if you are game’ (Guttman, 2005: 57). 
Friedman’s arguments also strongly appealed to the big business sector 
and rentier interests, particularly his notion of ‘crowding out’.29 His visit 
nourished the views of private sector economists like David Love of 
Syntec who had been charting the money supply as a guide to nominal 
                                                          
29 ‘Crowding out’ is ‘Where increased public expenditure diverts money or resources 
away from the private sector’ (Sloman and Norris, 2002: 565). Nevile (1995) 
provides a strong critical theoretical and empirical evaluation of this concept in the 
Australian context. 
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income fluctuations. The RBA also began to issue graphs showing the 
rate of monetary growth in its statistical bulletins. 
An astute player in public relations, Friedman made no reference during 
his visit to Cairns’s views on money and unemployment. To bolster 
monetarism in response to the Friedman visit, an opposition politician, 
Bert Kelly, sarcastically asked the Treasurer in Parliament: that ‘If 
printing money is a good solution why not print more of the stuff and get 
rid of the unemployment problem altogether?’ Cairns rather foolishly 
replied that ‘We might do precisely that’ (cited in Ormonde, 1981: 213). 
It was a damaging admission, for monetarism and the ‘inflation-first’ 
position was winning over adherents even within the Labor Party. 
Brogan conceded that by this time some within the Cabinet agreed that 
inflation and unemployment were positively related and not negatively as 
specified in the standard Keynesian-Philips curve analysis.30 Even 
Cairns had earlier criticised the Liberals for bestowing the current 
inflation upon Australia by allowing excessive monetary growth to occur 
while in office. Cairns’s parliamentary response to Kelly was 
immediately damaging to his credibility, with the financial press critical 
of his understanding of the processes of inflation.31 Then in early May, 
speaking as Acting Prime Minister, Cairns said there would be big cuts in 
government spending, in the hope that this would moderate growth in 
money supply, and declared that ‘…the main problem facing Australia 
today is inflation’ (cited in Ormonde, 1981: 215). The Keynesian citadel 
had been truly breached from the inside. 
Despite Cairns’s acknowledgment of the need to moderate money supply 
growth, he remained essentially Keynesian. On the 8 May 1975 he wrote 
in a confidential Cabinet submission on budget strategy for 1975-76, that 
for the control of inflation ‘…money supply should not be treated as a 
primary instrument’ (Cairns, 2005: 3, original emphasis). Cairns 
regarded fiscal policy and wages/income policy as much more important. 
Cairns supported Robinson by going on to state that money supply 
should ‘…be adjusted to meet the needs of the economy’ (Cairns, 2005: 
                                                          
30 ‘The big risk: Inflation could hit 30 per cent plus’ The National Times 14 April 
1975. 
31 ‘More public spending is not what the doctor should order’ The National Times 21 
April 1975. 
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7). Reducing inflation ‘…without causing unacceptable unemployment, 
production losses and surplus capacity’ (Cairns, 2005: 12) was 
predominant in the Cairns budget strategy. John Menadue, Head of the 
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, was critical of Cairns’s 
Cabinet submission which reflected a strong Monetarist position. 
Menadue argues that ‘[t]he Treasurer’s submission is very vague on 
monetary policy’ and ‘…does not make clear, in our view, …that 
containment of the present excessive rate of monetary growth requires a 
substantial reduction in the prospective budget deficit’ (Menadue, 2005: 
4 & 2, original emphasis). Senior economics-based public servants, led 
by Menadue, were clearly undermining the Treasurer. 
Cairns’s chief rival in economic policy, Bill Hayden, became the new 
Treasurer on 5 June 1975, and presented the 1975-76 Budget with an 
‘inflation first’ focus.32  Hayden proclaimed that Australia was no longer 
living in ‘…the simple Keynesian world in which some reduction in 
unemployment could, apparently, always be purchased at the cost of 
more inflation. Today it is inflation itself which is the central policy 
problem. More inflation simply leads to more unemployment’.33 34 
By August 1975, the Whitlam Government had made a belated attempt 
to gain some political traction by adopting a mild form of monetarism. 
However, this rapid change in economic thought and practice arguably 
undermined its credibility while conceding ground to the Liberal-
Country Party Opposition and to what was fast becoming the new 
‘conventional wisdom’ in the public perception. This perception was 
vindicated by a well-timed announcement, bestowing the ‘Bank of 
Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel’ onto 
Friedman in October 1976, which gave further legitimacy to monetarism. 
                                                          
32 With public confidence in him sagging, Cairns was removed from the Treasury 
portfolio by Whitlam. He was later removed from the entire ministry after being 
found guilty of an impropriety to do with overseas loan-raising while serving as 
Treasurer. 
33 W.G Hayden, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 19 August 1975, 53. 
34 Over a year later the British Prime Minister James Callaghan told the annual 
meeting of the British Labour Party essentially the same thing, namely, that 
Keynesianism, in an inflationary environment, no longer worked (Morgan, 1997: 
507). 
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Despite the Nobel Prize, the Friedman position remained somewhat 
contentious within the mainstream economics profession because of its 
questionable theoretical and empirical elements. For the next two 
decades, all the mainstream textbooks carried a chapter on the Keynesian 
versus Monetarist debate. However, politically, the debate had been 
clearly won by Friedman at the head of his monetarist brigade. The 
Friedman visit to Australia was followed by two publications, CEDA 
(1975) and Friedman (1975). The latter was a small, cheap monograph 
that sold very well and appeared on many economics teachers’ bookcases 
throughout Australia. The Friedman Monday Conference programme 
was illegally copied in schools and universities, to be shown endlessly 
over the next few years.  
‘Operation Friedman’ had some strong aspects that led to its 
overwhelming success: (i) a protagonist (Friedman) who was 
charismatic, persuasive and exuded credibility; (ii) a compliant and 
uncritical media that was willing to give much space to the visit; (iii) 
some domestic economists (especially in powerful positions of economic 
management) springing to the defence of this questionable theory; (iv) 
business interests supporting (financially and credibility-wise) the whole 
operation and becoming convinced that the message was getting across 
to the masses; and crucially (v) a confused, vacillating and sometimes 
complacent ‘Keynesian’ leadership (both politically and academically). 
Friedman and the Political Business Cycle 
A close observer of the drama of the Whitlam years recalls that the 
Friedman episode shows the ‘…ability of ideas to shape one conception 
of the world as powerfully as events themselves’ (Hughes, 1980: 114). In 
Australia, the tide of events had certainly conspired against standard 
‘stop-go’ Keynesianism but the visit of an eminent economist, who 
injected new ideas of economic management into the public domain, was 
a decisive element. Inflation was the new economic issue of the time and 
Friedman was undoubtedly the man of the hour. In the context of the 
thirty-year anniversary of this watershed visit, it is its lasting effect that 
provides a clear example of what Kalecki predicted was the basic 
contradiction of Keynesian economic management: the lack of 
130     JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIAN POLITICAL ECONOMY  No 57 
 
commitment by powerful groups within capitalism to provide what 
Galbraith (1977: 197) called ‘Mandarin controlled capitalism’ which 
would allow for permanent full employment and a more equitable 
distribution of resources. Kalecki wrote that any such attempt would be 
undermined, creating a ‘stop-go’ political business cycle (PBC). 
Keynes (1936) expressed the faith that the power of his effective demand 
idea would be used to stabilise the business cycle at full employment. 
Kalecki (1943) also recognised the powerful tool of effective demand 
management (given that he developed this same analysis in 1933), while 
also emphasising the stronger power of business interests to prevent this 
process from occurring.  Kalecki specified three fears that capitalists 
would have with Keynesian full employment: (i) loss of economic 
control, as public policy demand management would effectively deprive 
capitalists of their power to influence economic conditions and also 
governments themselves; (ii) loss of policy control as governments 
extend their impact through their own investment spending into the areas 
regarded as businesses’ legitimate sphere of influence (e.g. transport, 
public utilities); (iii) loss of industrial control of the workforce if full 
employment is maintained over the long-run, so that ‘the sack’ ceases to 
play its disciplinary role for businesses. Responding to these three 
concerns businesses’ state of confidence would be reflected in 
investment decisions and the business cycle that they generate. 
Towards the top of the expansion phase of the cycle, the combination of 
profit squeeze and inflationary pressures can be expected to manifest 
itself as an adverse shift in business confidence. This is reflected in profit 
rates falling, financial gearing rising and capacity utilisation falling as 
large capital investment projects come on stream at the time when 
growth in consumption is slowing down (Courvisanos, 1996). Business 
interests and rentier interests then welcome mainstream economists 
identifying the economy as ‘unsound’, as per the opening Kalecki quote. 
Pressure is placed on governments to renege on full employment 
commitments and to introduce the ‘stop’ elements of fine-tuning by 
dampening effective demand through the use of monetary and fiscal 
policy instruments. This ensures the demise of old capital stock and the 
reduction in real wages, essential for the renewal of capitalism (Galbraith 
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and Darity, 1994: 459-68).35 During the 1950s and 1960s, this approach 
seemed to ensure the sustainability of the ‘stop-go’ form of 
Keynesianism in Australia as both sides of the political spectrum played 
out their ritual roles within this paradigm. 
The ‘stop-go’ fine-tuning economic management approach was a clear 
indication of how governments had ‘bastardised’ Keynesian economics 
to suit their short-term economic interests, especially after much of the 
means of production were destroyed during World War II. The major 
shift in economic conditions in the early 1970s, following the 1974 
OPEC oil price rises and consequent huge international capital flows, 
resulted in the business sector not being satisfied with the ‘bastardised’ 
Keynesian status quo. This applied particularly to financial capitalists 
who stood to lose the most under the rising world-wide inflation. They 
acted by using Friedman in the USA and also on a global tour that 
included countries where the USA had considerable financial interests 
(Chile, Australia, South Africa).  
A new form of PBC emerged with the advent of the Friedman world 
tour. This is the Steindl (1979) version of Kalecki’s PBC outlined below, 
which sees a paradigm shift in policy-making from the Keynesian ‘stop-
go’ mechanism to the neo-liberal political trend incorporating 
contractionary macro policy with minimal statism. Friedman, as an 
effective showman, served as a valuable ideologue (in the Kaleckian 
sense) to usher in the paradigm shift in Australia. Friedman, whilst in 
Australia, managed to influence government departments, support 
financial interests and provide much rational justification for a compliant 
press to disseminate. The neo-liberal political trend was being set in 
place in Australia as it was in other western economies, and Friedman 
assisted the intellectual and political acceptance of this long-term 
objective. The Australian context was particularly interesting in that a 
popular new Prime Minister’s creditability was being undermined from 
within its own ranks through economic incompetence, social angst and 
political opportunism. However, it was Friedman and the Monetarist 
                                                          
35 Kennedy (1973) provides empirical support in the U.K (1953 to 1971) for a 
‘predominantly’ planned ‘stop-go’ policy approach, with technical errors due to 
poor forecasting playing only a relatively minor role. 
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approach that made the neo-liberal alternative paradigm attractive and 
legitimate in Australia as well as in the other countries going through the 
same broad economic and political processes at around the same time. 
Steindl (1979), Bhaduri and Steindl (1983) and Catley and McFarlane 
(1981) used the analysis pioneered by Kalecki (1943) to explain the long-
term implications of the PBC in terms of a ‘political trend’. These studies 
draw on the historical development of advanced capitalist economies like 
the USA, United Kingdom and Australia to show that the shift in 
economic policies in the early 1970s from Keynesian ‘stop-go’ policies 
to Friedmanite monetarism and neo-liberalism was due to the same three 
fears identified by Kalecki (1943) and outlined above. The difference is 
that in this version of the class-based PBC a longer timeframe allows for 
what Mair and Laramie (2002: 568) refer to as ‘…feedbacks between 
capitalists and workers over the political and social tensions of full 
employment to work themselves through.’ These feedback effects 
generate rent-seeking behaviour by powerful monopoly control interests 
who form ‘distributional coalitions’ of rentiers and big business to shift 
profit shares upwards by establishing obstacles on the road to full 
employment with contractionary fiscal budgets and reduced monetary 
growth. Mair and Laramie (2002) provide empirical evidence from the 
United Kingdom to reveal that the end of the post-war full employment-
based ‘stop-go’ strategy in the early 1970s coincided with the only 
significant period of income share turbulence. Aschauer (2000) sets out 
empirical evidence for the USA that supports this contractionary political 
trend with the decline of public investment since the early 1970s. Catley 
and McFarlane (1981) provide similar historical evidence for Australia 
which reinforces the argument of how crucial Friedman’s visit was to the 
commencement of this shift from ‘stop-go’ PBC to ‘political trend’ PBC. 
Conclusion 
The changing political and economic conditions in the mid-1970s 
enabled the capitalist class to assert its economic and social dominance 
over labour and to ‘cleanse’ the economy of inefficient and oversupplied 
old capital stock built up during the early post-World War II period of 
protective regulatory capitalism. This is the significance of the Friedman 
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visit; it provided a paradigm shift to neo-liberalism - a political stance 
where by governments abandoned the Keynesian ideal of full 
employment and more equitable distribution of resources. Instead, 
government’s role came to be seen as a limited one that ensures inflation 
is contained. Beyond that, government should stay out of the economic 
system in order to allow the market mechanism to operate for the benefit 
of shareholders and the managers of capital. The media obsession with 
the monthly movements in the interest rate and the maintenance of low 
inflation is, thirty years on, a partial legacy of Friedman’s visit, 
outlasting the temporary victory of a questionable monetarist theory and 
money supply targeting that was practised up till 1985. What followed 
after 1985 was a more substantial overhaul of the macroeconomic policy 
agenda towards ‘inflation-first’, less interventionist, strategies as a 
medium-term objective. In Australia, Friedman was the bulwark that 
helped to justify the initial neo-liberal political shift. This article shows 
that the shift can be understood in terms of a Kaleckian ‘political trend’ 
political business cycle.   
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